Reviews (3)

It's painted a turn-on red...
Often duplicated, never imitated -- this is the real "Boss Hoss" of mathematical logic textbooks.People complain about the "cathedral-like" architectonic of this (unfinished) book, and there are more symbols than you'd ever need, but that's cool 'cause Church is really having a symbol party in the book (and yes, those crazy lambdas are invited): you can see those symbols gettin' wild right there on the page.And people think it's out of date, but the real story is that this is the most logistic power which is really street legal -- anything more and you're having a conversation with yourself.Is it safe?Hell no; even my second-order logic still doesn't work right.But in the right hands, it'll shut any fool down.

a classic, but mostly useful as a historical reference
I give this book 5 stars out of respect for its enormous contribution to mathematical logic; for no doubt many of the authors of the more modern math-logic texts were greatly influenced by this book. But with that said, all of the material here is a proper subset of other current books which present the material much more clearly and using better notation. Examples include Burris' "Logic for Mathematics and Computer Science", Ebbinhaus' "Intro. To Math Logic", and Gallier's "Logic for Computer Scientists".

One of the classics
This book, which first appeared in print as an issue in Annals of Mathematics in 1944, is now a classic in mathematical logic, and is still worth perusing in spite of the out-dated notation. The author outlines comprehensively the propositional calculus and predicate calculus. Although the book is mostly formal in its style, the author does introduce the reader to some elementary notions in logic, and some brief commentary on what would now be classified as philosophical logic. He defines logic as the analysis of propositions and their proof according to their form and not their content. He notes also that inductive logic and the theory of partial confirmation should also be included as part of mathematical logic. There are exercises throughout the book, and so it could conceivably be used as a textbook, in spite of its publication date. The book could better be used as a historical supplement to a course in mathematical logic or one in the philosophy of logic.

In the introduction to the book the author defines the terms and concepts he will use in the book, with a discussion of proper names, constants and variables, functions, and sentences. He adopts the Fregian point of view that sentences are names of a particular kind. His discussion of this is rather vague however, for he does not give enough clarification of the difference between an "assertive" use of a sentence and its "non-assertive" use. Readers will have to do further reading on Frege in order to understand this distinction more clearly, but essentially what Church is saying here is that sentences are names with truth values. The existential and universal quantifiers are introduced as well. And here the author also introduces the concepts of object language and metalanguage, along with a discussion of the axiomatic method. The author distinguishes between informal and formal axiomatic methods. The modern notions of syntax and semantics are given a nice treatment here, and the di

scussion is more in-depth than one might get in more modern texts on mathematical logic.

Chapter 1 is a detailed overview of propositional logic, being the usual formal system with three symbols, one constant, an infinite number of variables, rules on how to form well-formed formulas, and the rules of inference. The deduction theorem is proved in detail along with a discussion of the decision problem for propositional logic, with the famous truth tables due to W. Quine introduced here. The notions of consistency and completeness are briefly discussed.

The discussion of the propositional calculus is continued in the next chapter where a new system of propositional calculus is obtained by dropping the constants from the first one and adding another symbol (negation). The two systems are shown to be equivalent to each other using a particular well-formed formula in the second one to replace the constant in the first. Other systems of propositional calculus are also introduced here, using the idea of primitive connectives such as disjunction, along with various rules of inference. Church also outlines an interesting propositional calculus due to J.G.P.Nicod, which assumes only one primitive connective, one axiom, and only one rule of inference (besides substitution). The author also introduces partial systems of propositional calculus, with the goal of showing just what must be added to these systems to obtain the full propositional calculus. He discusses the highly interesting and thought-provoking intuitionistic propositional calculus, due to A. Heyting, which is a formalization of the famous mathematical intuitionism of L.E.J. Brouwer. The system he discusses is a variant of Heyting's and he gives references to the positive solution of the decision problem for this system. The author ends the chapter with a brief discussion of how to construct a propositional calculus by employing axiom schemata.

The author then moves on to what he has termed functional calculi of first order beginning in the next chapter. Called predicate calculi in today's parlance, the author first defines the pure functional calculus of first order, and shows that the theorems of the propositional calculus also follow when considered as part of this system. Free and bound variables are defined, and Church proves explicitly the consistency of this system, and the deduction theorem. The important construction of a prenex normal form of a well-formed formula is discussed, and the author shows that every well-formed formula of the functional calculus is equivalent to some well-formed formula in prenex normal form.

In chapter 4, the author gives an alternative formulation of pure functional calculus of first order, wherein rules of substitution are used and axiom schemata are replaced by instances, making the number of axioms finite. The Skolem normal form of a well-formed formula is defined, which sets up a discussion of satisfiability and validity. The author then proves the Godel completeness theorem, which states that every valid well-formed formula is a theorem. This is followed by a very well written discussion of the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem, and an overview of the decision problem in functional (predicate) calculus.

Reviews (2)

Useful but a bit mis-pitched
This is a very bread-and-butter introduction to proof theory.Apart from digressions, it is not until we are five-sixths of the way through the book that we begin to meet formal systems in which any actual mathematics can be formalized (chapter 10).The first nine chapters are devoted to studying, in great detail, a plethora of purely logical systems.Anyone who thought, under the influence of Hilbert, perhaps, that proof theory was about proving the consistency of classical mathematics will probably be seriously disappointed with this book.

This is the main flaw in the book.Computer scientists (of whom I am not one) might like it; but beginners looking for an explanation of the relevance of proof theory to either mathematics or philosophy will probably not find what they are looking for, at least through the first five-sixths of the book.

Why is proof theory interesting?I could be missing something, but I just do not see that the authors have anything much to say about this question - rather a serious fault in an introductory textbook, surely?The book is very clear and the style is pleasant; but a great many hairs are split and a beginner cannot be expected to see that there is anything much to be gained from doing so.

Despite these faults, for readers who *already* possess a moderately advanced knowledge of proof theory and want a really thorough, in-depth treatment of the very basics of the subject, this book is very useful.A thing I particularly liked is the emphasis given to considerations about the lengths of proofs (sections 5.1 and 6.7).Some textbooks on proof theory either do not treat pure logic at all (Pohlers) or do treat it but without giving any information about what cut-elimination in pure logic does to the length of a proof (Schuette).The latter strategy is perverse.Considerations about lengths of proofs are undeniably important when the proofs in question are infinitely long; yet students of the subject should be allowed to see that the considerations that apply here are just generalizations of the same considerations as they apply to finitely long proofs.You will understand the advanced stuff better if you know the basics as well.

People doing research in proof theory might also welcome the fact that the authors discuss quite a wide variety of logical systems, thus giving the reader a chance to weigh up the merits and disadvantages of each.

Anyone wanting a first introduction to proof theory will probably find the one by Pohlers a lot more exciting than this one.Of the older books, the one by Girard is the one that bears the closest resemblance to this book: in fact, this book covers much of the same ground as the earlier chapters of Girard's, but is easier to follow.On the other hand, because Girard goes much further into thesubject, he allows you better to see the relevance of the basics to the more advanced material.

You Call Yourselves Analytic Philosophers?
That this book is not yet a foundational text in American graduate programs for analytic philosophy (or mathematics or computer science, for that matter) says something about an intellectual boundary those disciplines do not want to openly cross.Troelstra and Schwichtenberg, two hardened proof theorists with a mathematical conception of the issues involved in proof theory, cover nearly all of that subdiscipline's 70-year history in this affordable volume; and while it's not the clearest book ever written on the subject, it's a damn sight less obfuscatory than the Springer and North-Holland "monographs" (perhaps) available on the topic.

It's absolutely no fun to read at all, but it is resolutely Bourbakist in its avoidance of "proprioprecocity"; you will learn nothing that will impress others from reading this book, but you will also learn that intellectual techniques and ideas you thought were "cutting-edge" should be disquoted.And although the deflation of "minimalist" accounts of truth awaits an ill-tempered model theorist able to write competent English, this book contains contains a future of sorts for analytic thought; circling around the issues raised by computational complexity, as manifested in thought and action.

Reviews (4)

Finally, an approach to Modal Logic for the new century...
If you're wondering why modal language is so useful but are dismayed about possible worlds, then this is your book.(Side note:when does Blackburn sleep?how can you be at the forefront of modal logic and natural language processing at the same time?)

A great gateway into the world of Modal Logics
This book is excellent in content. It is definitely not a book that one should expect to read in one sitting, nor two or three. This is a book one needs to grow into. There is a basic track and an advanced track and these are clearly marked throughout the book. It is presumed that the reader should have at least some familiarity with both basic set theory and first order logic. The first four chapters would be the best introduction as a first read. If you are interested in modern algebra, chapter 5 will present interesting connections between Modal Logic and Algebra. The book has several Appendixes: A Logical Toolkit, An Algebraic Toolkit and A Computational Toolkit. These can be very handy if you can't remember what an ultrafilter is or what the difference is between NP and PSPACE. Another very nice feature of this book is that every chapter ends with a historical overview of the people and concepts involved in the material just covered. This really makes the subject more "alive" and makes the study of Modal Logic more purposeful and motivated.

At the time of writing this, I do not know how this book compares to other introductions to the field of Modal Logic. Moreover, as a student of Yde Venema and of Maarten de Rijke (two of the authors), I am perhaps slightly biased. Nevertheless, I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to seriously delve into the world of Modal Logic.

Reviews (1)

Isbn: 0691044902
Sales Rank: 163226
Subjects:  1. Advanced    2. Calculus    3. Logic, Symbolic and mathematic    4. Logic, Symbolic and mathematical    5. Mathematical Analysis    6. Mathematical And Symbolic Logic    7. Mathematics    8. Nonstandard mathematical analy    9. Nonstandard mathematical analysis    10. Science/Mathematics    11. Mathematics / Advanced    12. Physics   

Isbn: 095026346X

Reviews (4)

You're supposed to get down?Damn, that's already low.
I own the Ben Fowkes translation of this book (generally reputed to be Marx's most complete theoretical statement, and none too early); but trying to find it on Amazon makes me wonder if I should.The Penguin edition of this book is widely available, the Vintage formerly so, the German Dietz-Verlag version on Amazon.de, and the International Publishers version (directly from "critical" edition MEGA) not at all.How much does the "approved" translation cost?$50.00 for two hardback volumes.Is this something people might want to buy in lieu of an inexpensively produced paperback?Yeah.Is this the most important book ever written?Marx certainly wouldn't have you think that.But is this particular version worth owning?Sure -- don't expect to find this at your local library.

Tough but Worthwhile
A collection of seven notebooks on capital and money, drafted during the winter of 1857-8, exploring the themes and theses that dominate his later writings, including Marx's own version of Hegel's dialectics, and thoughts on alientation.While not as sophisticatedp--or lengthy--as Das Kapital, it remains a "must read" for anyone interested developing a sophisticated understanding of Marxist philosophy.

Critical Reading
Unlike many other works, the Grundrisse exposes in more obvious ways Marx's dialectical thought.The Introduction should really be read as a great antidote to the 1859 Preface to a Critique of Political Economy,which gave us the base-superstructure analogy.The weakest link in Marx'sthough may very well be found there.The Grundrisse Introduction startsfrom the point of view of class struggle, whereas there is no place for theclass struggle as the driving force in the base-superstructureschema.

Also, Grundrisse starts in a different place from Capital.Thereis a reason for this, and a good discussion of this can be found in thewriting of Raya Dunayevskaya and a counter discussion can be found in RomanRosdolsky.The choice to eventually shelve the organization of theGrundrisse for the organization of Capital flows in part from the changesin the intervening years, most notably the U.S. Civil War.

Reviews (2)

Excellent
Topos theory now has applications in fields such as music theory, quantum gravity, artificial intelligence, and computer science. It has been viewed by some as being excessively abstract and difficult to learn, and this is certainly true if one attempts to learn it from the research literature. The use of this book to learn topos theory certainly puts this view to rest, as the authors have given the readers an introduction to topos theory that is crystal clear and nicely motivated from an historical point of view. Indeed the prologue to the book gives the reader a deep appreciation of the origins of the subject, and could even serve as an introduction to a class on algebraic geometry.

An understanding of sheaf theory and category theory will definitely help when attempting to learn topos theory, but the book could be read without such a background. Readers who want to read the chapters on logic and geometric morphisms will need a background in mathematical logic and set theory in order to appreciate them. Topos theory has recently been used in research in quantum gravity. A reader interested in understanding how topos theory is used in this research should concentrate on the chapter on properties of elementary topoi, the one on basic categories of topoi, and the chapter on localic topoi.

The authors introduce topos theory as a tool for unifying topology with algebraic geometry and as one for unifying logic and set theory. The latter application is interesting, especially for readers (such as this reviewer), who approach the book from the standpoint of the former. Indeed, the authors discuss a fascinating use of topos theory by Paul Cohen in his proof of the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

The prologue for this book is excellent, and should be read for the many insights and motivations for the subject of topos theory. The elementary category theory needed is then outlined in the next section. A "topos" is essentially a category that allows the construction of pullbacks, products, and so on, with the philosophy being that objects are to be viewed not only as things but as also having maps (functors) between them. In the section on categories of functors, this viewpoint becomes very transparent due to the many examples of categories that are also topoi are discussed. These examples are presented first so as to motivate the general definition of topos later on. Some of these categories are very familiar, such as the category of sets, the category of all representations of a fixed group, presheaves, and sheaves. Of particular interest in this section is the discussion of the propositional calculus, and its representation as a Boolean algebra. Replacing the propositional calculus with the (Heyting) intuitionistic propositional calculus results in a different representation by a Heyting algebra. From the standpoint of ordinary topology, the Heyting algebra is significant in that the algebra of open sets is not Boolean, i.e. the complement (or "negation") of an open set is closed and not open in general Instead it follows the rules of a Heyting algebra. This type of logic appears again when considering the subobjects in the sheaf category, which have a "negation" which belong to a Heyting algebra. Thus topos theory is one that follows more than not the Brouwer intuitionistic philosophy of mathematics. Recently, research in quantum gravity has indicated the need for this approach, and so readers interested in this research will find the needed background in this part of the book.

After a straightforward overview of how sheaf theory fits into the topos-theoretic framework, the authors also discuss the role of the Grothendieck topology in sheaf theory. This involves thinking of an open neighborhood of a point in a space as more than just a monomorphism of that neighborhood into the space (all the open neighborhoods thus furnishing a "covering" of the space). This need was motivated by certain constructions in algebraic geometry and Galois theory, as the authors explain in fair detail. A covering of a space by open sets is replaced by a new covering by maps that are not monomorphisms. Starting with a category that allows pullbacks, an indexed family of maps to an object of this category is considered. If for each object in this category one uses a rule to select a certain set of such families, called the coverings of the object under this rule, then ordinary sheaf theory can be used on these coverings. If one desires to drop the requirement that the category have pullbacks, this can be done by introducing a category that comes with such "covering families." This is the origin of the Grothendieck topologies, wherein the indexed families are replaced by the sieves that they generate. A Grothendieck topology on a category is thus a function that assigns to each object in the category a collection of sieves on the object (this function must have certain properties which are discussed by the authors). Several examples of categories with the Grothendieck topologies are discussed, one of these being a complete Heyting algebra. Another example discussed comes from algebraic topology, via its use of the Zariski topology for algebraic varieties. The discussion of this example is brilliant, and in fact could be viewed as a standalone discussion of algebraic geometry.

When considering the notion of the Grothendieck topology, the authors define the notion of a `site', which is essentially a (small) category along with a Grothendieck topology on the category. They then show how to define sheaves on a site, which then form a category. A `Grothendieck topos' is then a category which is equivalent to the category of sheaves on some site. The authors then show, interestingly, that a complete Heyting algebra can be realized as a subobject lattice in a Grothendieck topos.

Isbn: 0199246181
Sales Rank: 594172
Subjects:  1. Abstraction    2. Algebra - Abstract    3. Logic    4. Mathematics    5. Philosophy    6. Philosophy of mathematics    7. Western philosophy, c 1600 to c 1800   

Editorial Review

Reviews (1)

Isbn: 041521534X
Sales Rank: 923631
Subjects:  1. Logic    2. Logic, Symbolic and mathematic    3. Logic, Symbolic and mathematical    4. Philosophy    5. Mathematical theory of computation    6. Philosophy of language   

Reviews (4)

Previous Review Suspect
This is a highly regarded text on model theory, which is a branch of mathematical logic. What model theory is NOT is ". . . what is(sic) sounds like: mathematical models (of the physical and mathematical worlds)", which is a quote that appears in an earlier review.

Excellent
This textbook is an efficient condensation of Hodges's bulkier and moreleisurely "Model Theory". As such, it excludes some of the"fun" topics in the larger book as well as the nice bibliography.On the other hand, it is a truly excellent textbook for model theory and,in fact, for logic (for those with some idea of what *that*is.)

Personally, I would have liked to see the following topics at leastmentioned: higher-order languages, typed languages, ultraproducts, gametheory. Nevertheless, this book is still the best and clearest textbook formodel theory.

Reviews (34)

Monumental Masterpiece
This is an impossibly difficult text to read, but it is at the same time, one of the most valuable philosophical texts ever written.Seemingly inspired by Plato's Parmenides, it investigates how the actual and the ideal manifest through historical consciousness in a play of opposites.This is what is called by some the dialectic process.The introduction to the text is exceedingly valuable in understanding its meaning.In fact, some have said that if one reads the introduction, one need not read the text but this is hardly the case.While investigating aspects of human consciousness, Hegel attempts to compose a philosophical work of such circumspection that all of philosophy and history can be understood through his system, dialectic thesis, antithesis and synthesis.His main topic was the absolute and how it manifests in art, philosophy and religion.This seems at times to be the attempt of one man to reach God, but Hegel knew better than to believe that such a thing was possible.While the work does not achieve its goals, its influence cannot be underestimated, including the influence on the Hegel of the twentieth century: Hans Georg Gadamer.Hegel has left the philosophical community with a work so monumental and important that no lover of philosophy can go without reading this masterpiece.A close and careful reading of Phenomenology of Mind is highly recommended.

The Gathering Storm over the "New' in Philosophy:
Will Phenomenology and Logic ever agree?

Hegel has many a story to tell in this most amazing book. The most important, at least for our era, is the story of a final and complete reconciliation between all members of the human family. How could that, given the almost countless differences between myriad human groups, ever be achieved? Hegel achieves it by arguing (and dialectically showing) that everything partial, ambiguous and irrational in history is burned away in the process of that history until ...what? Until all that remains is all that could possibly (Hegel means theoretically and practically, logically and existentially) remain. There are, as you might guess, several non-trivial difficulties with a position as profound as this.

To begin, until the promised 'utopian' end-state finally and completely arrives different people interpret this end state differently. This is why Hegel reminds us that philosophy can only equal Science (of Wisdom) at the end of this phenomenal and historical process. Until then, and this is important, each and every understanding of Hegel necessarily remains mired in partiality, ambiguity and irrationality. (- This is also true, I would argue, of the ones that base themselves on (Hegel's) Logic.) But this, the ambiguity of speculative or dialectical Logic & Phenomenology, leads to other difficulties. For instance, this end state has been taken by `Hegelians' in either a religious or atheistic manner. But until world history catches up to the `necessities' of the Logic, whatever they may be, even something as fundamental as this necessarily remains ambiguous. Another problem, is Hegel himself at the end of this process (at least as far as Logic/System are concerned) or is he the beginning of the end of this process?

In fact, one can say, with perhaps only a little exaggeration, that the Logic itself waits, or seems to wait, on human history to turn the final page. But that is the problem with this `biography of Spirit' - does the hand that turns the page also write `new' pages? Is the Logic (and System, the full account of reality) changed too by the (seemingly endless) `phenomenological' ruses of human history? For if the `new' occurs in this sense (Logically) then there is no System at all. If you object that the Logic (or the Hegelian System) forbids the new (at least in Logic & System) then you will find yourself in the uncomfortable position of explaining how Hegel himself could introduce a new operator (the speculative or, if you prefer, the dialectic) into Logic.

For, while the `new' in history can be explained (or so Hegelians maintain) by the Logic, by the self-contained Circularity of the System, all this collapses, or so one suspects, if the new can also happen in the Logic. ...How does (or could) one explain, from within the System, the irruption of the new within the Logic? One cannot. This is why Kojeve (correctly and, from his point of view, necessarily) reminded us, in his great commentary on the Phenomenology, that Hegel "definitely reconciles himself with all that is and has been, by declaring that there will never more be anything new on earth." It is this `declaration' by Hegel that is the great stumbling block of the System. Did the new come to an end in Jena almost 200 years ago? Is the Logic the only thing that no longer develops in the Hegelian System? We all need to read the Phenomenology and the Logic together, each in the light of the other, again.

To reiterate all this in a different manner; for Hegel, one can indeed say that the System never encounters anything new. There is indeed only this great circularity of the Concept. But this is only correct from the standpoint of the Logic. From the standpoint of the Phenomenology (and History) the new does indeed emerge out of the ruins of the old. The `new' can perhaps be best understood as what's left after as much of the superfluous (the partial and ambiguous) and the unreasonable are subtracted (or burned away in the Golgotha of Spirit, the hell of history) as possible. It is only at the end of this process, the beginning of that end is the publication of the Phenomenology, that Logic and Being are precisely the same. Or, to put it yet another way, the only thing that doesn't change in Hegel is the System. Everything else, possibly even the Logic understood as the schematics of Spirit, moves. For Kojeve (and possibly Hegel) when movement finally stops (the End of History) one has the System entire. ...This is perhaps why Merleau-Ponty, in the Adventures of the Dialectic, calls this position of Kojeve an `idealization of death.'

As an aside I want to point out that the earlier mention of Kojeve should remind us of his great sparring partner, Leo Strauss, the great explicator of the esoteric. The political esoteric he writes about (and demonstrates in his commentaries on Plato, Al-Farabi, Maimonides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Nietzsche) is the only real methodological rival of Dialectics, at least for political philosophy. By way of comparison I will briefly say that Esotericism excludes nothing; everything comes back. There is no progress or change, not even through some exclusion of the negated. There is, of course, the hidden - but the hidden always returns, as the greatest modern esotericism, the one we find in Nietzsche, affirms. In esotericism the 'negated' (or hidden) remains, indeed, if it didn't remain esotericism would have no reason for continuing in its esoteric manner. This esoteric says there never was anything fundamentally new while the Hegelian Dialectic teaches that the new emerges until, and only until, Logic and Phenomenology are exactly the same. All that the esoteric requires is (exoteric) myth; all that the dialectical requires is Science. Each particular myth dies, but the necessity of myth is unending; while Science (in the Hegelian sense) seemingly can never reach birth. ...This is the impasse that the great methodological war of our time has brought us to: undying myths vs. unreachable Science.

There is so much more to say about this book and the vistas it has opened to philosophy. I will say only this, the Phenomenology is easily one of the most important texts in the history of philosophy; read it at your peril.

Reviews (2)

a work of genius
Read both books that contain all three volumes: in a way, the summation of Bataille's thoughts and written with clarity. It's not just the consumption-expenditure approach to analysing human activity that'sorginial, he is (as he states towards the end of vol. 3) the closestthinker to Nietzsche. That is an assertion that bears merit as Batailleexamines in as thorough a way possible (and in many ways supplements and isa good commentary on) Nietzsche's ideas of the overman, which he calls thesovereign man. At the core of his thoughts is Hamlet's last line, 'The restis silence'. Sovereignty is NOTHING. A brilliant and vital contribution tothe century's history of ideas.

Reviews (1)

Reviews (11)

Difficult but worth it
This book is one of the most important philosophy texts of the 20th century, if for no other reason than as an eye-opener. The text is a difficult read (although nowhere near as opaque as Derrida). The section on how our culture and, hence, our world-view has been "set" by accepted taxonomies is worth the read all by itself. I have come back to these comments again and again. Taxonomies are useful, but we need to understand the constraints on understanding imposed by such

Obtuse but Sharp
Foucault's stuff is hardly pleasure reading, but it rewards in other ways, more subtly.If you don't read Foucault without coming away with a deeper sense of the world around you, how power and knowledge is diffuse and not central, you would be a rare person.This book isn't so much concerned with power as it is the history of ideas, though.

Order ?
The order of things is the second book that I read by this late iconoclastic writer. I greatly enjoyed his stimulating and thought provoking "Discipline and Punish" (DP), yet after a struggle that I can only compare to my adolescent reading of the Brothers Karamazov, I ended this book with an overwhelming feeling of its futility.

This book started its life under the French title "les mots e les choses", things and words. In the introduction Foucault tries to provide the reader with both an explanation and a road map for this archaeological expedition. He explains that this book should be seen as an attempt towards describing the evolution of representation of the world in thoughts/words over the last 5 centuries. Not a small task, and not an easy one for that matter.

It is unfortunate that Foucault did not follow the approach that he chose in DP. In that book he chose one central leitmotiv, the spread of discipline from the military throughout an increasingly complex society, and could leave the "main road" at many instances without the risk of the reader getting lost. This book dearly misses such a backbone. Even worse: whenever Foucault seems to suggest one, he willfully/deviously/confusingly immediately takes an unannounced turn. For example in the introduction he goes in detail about the representation of the world in a language of words. O.K. you think, that sets us on a track of a history of the world with Kant at a critical juncture. Yet in the first chapter we suddenly get a cold shower of a completely chaotic and overwrought description of a Velasquez painting, that has been done much better using less than 10% of the number of words, and is at complete odds with the goals set in the introduction.

Next Foucault visits Cervantes' masterpiece. He describes Don Q. as representing man before arrival of the stage of distinction between things and their representations. Cute of course, but wasn't Cervantes fictitious book meant as a comedy. On top of that, one cannot help but consider Cervantes own representation of the first part of DQ in the second a much clearer exploration of the subject of representation than Foucault's.

However, inspired by Don Q., Mickey F. chooses his own collection of windmills and goes on a quest that has way more in common with a self-gratulatory/-exploratory/-gratifying acid trip, than the archaeological quest that he promised. Purposely mentioning Kant as the gatekeeper between to eras, but wasting disproportionate amounts of words on some often obscure lesser gods, Foucault could not have done a better job in helping a well-intentioned reader to get lost in this onanistic swamp.

Isbn: 0262631148
Sales Rank: 673026
Subjects:  1. Computer Books: Languages    2. Computers    3. Human information processing    4. Neuropsychology    5. Physiological Psychology    6. Programming Languages - General    7. Psychology    8. Computers / Programming Languages / General   

Isbn: 086091688X
Sales Rank: 398732
Subjects:  1. Anthropology - Cultural    2. General    3. Philosophy    4. Philosophy, Marxist    5. Pleasure    6. Psychoanalysis and philosophy    7. Violence    8. Women   

Editorial Review