Vietnam: The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict
by Michael Lind
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Paperback (16 July, 2002)
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Editorial Review

This original and provocative book is certain to raise emotions. Its justification of America's war in Southeast Asia directly contradicts other recent studies, such asFredrik Logevall's Choosing War andRobert S. McNamara'sArgument Without End.Michael Lind, Washington Editor for Harper's magazine, examines the American military response to North Vietnamese aggression; American credibility during the cold war; domestic politics; and constitutional aspects of the conflict. He places the war's center of gravity in American public opinion rather than in the population of South Vietnam or the North Vietnamese army. In doing so, he can be blunt, as when he claims that members of the Western left who made excuses for the North Vietnamese land-reform terror were "apologists for state-sponsored genocide." One of his conclusions is that if the United States is to continue to be the dominant world power, "then American soldiers must learn to swim in quagmires." Viewing America's Southeast Asian adventure in the context of the cold war, Lind regards it not as a crime, betrayal, or tragic error, but as an unavoidable confrontation. Whether you agree with his arguments, Vietnam: The Necessary War intelligently, often vehemently, challenges preconceptions that surround the most controversial military conflict in American history. --John Stevenson ... Read more

Reviews (47)

History written by a loser.
From Lind, verbatim: "Who won and who lost the Vietnam War?The only complete losers were the officials of South Vietnam, whose state was erased from the map."May the dead, maimed and mourningfind some comfort that their misery could be yet more abject: they could be suffering the pain of the war's cartographic consequences.
"Necessary War"? - Unnecessay B.S.

Short, Sweet and to the point
The word that most aptly describes Michael Linds short concise reinterpretation of Vietnam is EXCEPTIONAL.Without giving away the ending Linds skewers ALL the sacred cows of Vietnam history and mythology.From the "Not allowed to Win" theory of the right to the "Unconstitutional War" and "Unjust War" theories on the left, to name but a few.Perspective is the tool Lind uses to dispell the myths and correct the erroneous history.The Cold War and its outcome are the prism through which Linds views the conflict and reveals the unpalatable truths of what he justifiably calls "the Necessary War".I highly recommend this work to anyone looking for a fresh take on what has become a rather stale subject.You may not agree with the conclusions Lind draws but none can argue the facts he presents.Only the most jaded cynic or hardened partisan will fail to see the insight Lind brings to the subject.

Johnson accepted the wrong advice and lost the war
Lind(L)does an above average job in this book.There is ,however, a major lapse in his presentation.Early in 1965,President Johnson had a meeting with McNamara,the Bundy brothers,and General of the Air Force Curtis LeMay.LeMay believed that he could end the war in 3 months by means of an around the clock bombing campaign.If this did not end the war,he was fully prepared to destroy the Red River dike (flood control)system.The North Vietnamese would have been warned in advanced that the dikes would be destroyed.This,in fact,would certainly have ended the war.Unfortunately,LeMay's last words to President Johnson in this meeting were that he was "going to bomb them back into the Stone Age"(L is certainly correct that much of LeMay's past advice to American Presidents about applying strategic bombing was either doubtful and/or questionable-see page 104.However,this reviewer believes that in this case LeMay got it right).One of the Bundy brothers piped up that the North Vietnamese were already living in the Stone Age. President Johnson agreed.This won the day for McNamara and the Bundy brothers to apply their academic(economics and political science) game theory approach,which called for a series of bombing escalation campaigns(to impose a cost for not negotiating to end the war)and deescalations(a benefit or reward for negotiating an end to the war).Based on the assumption that the North Vietnamese were rational utility maximizers,they would supposedly negotiate an end to the war.Johnson had a good chance of ending the war in early to mid 1965.Instead,he took the policy advice of academics as opposed to the expert(in this case) advice of LeMay.The result was that the war lasted another 10 years.President Johnson needed to emulate President Lincoln's approach during the American Civil War-do whatever it takes to win the war as soon as possible.War is hell,so get it over with. ... Read more

Isbn: 0684870274
Subjects:  1. Asia - Southeast Asia    2. Ethics & Moral Philosophy    3. History    4. History - Military / War    5. Military    6. Military - Vietnam War    7. United States - 20th Century    8. History / General   

America in Vietnam
by Guenter Lewy
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Paperback (01 April, 1980)
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Reviews (1)

Still worth reading
Though this book was published in 1978, only three years after Vietnam fell to the Communists, this book says some insightful things about the war in Vietnam and makes many valid points.Lewy demonstrates the superficiality of the more extreme opponents of the war--those who accused the US of violating international law but were blind to the horrors involved in the actions of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong.This is a well-researched and balanced study of the issues which engaged the interest of the world while the war was going on, and is illuminating and full of important information. ... Read more

Isbn: 0195027329
Sales Rank: 166887
Subjects:  1. 1945-    2. History    3. History - General History    4. Military - Vietnam War    5. United States    6. United States - 20th Century    7. Vietnam War, 1961-1975    8. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975    9. American history: postwar, from c 1945 -    10. Asian / Middle Eastern history: postwar, from c 1945 -    11. USA    12. Vietnam    13. Warfare & Defence   

To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Americans and Southeast Asians (Vietnam War Era Classics Series)
by Al Santoli, Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Al Santoli
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Paperback (01 April, 1999)
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Reviews (2)

Superb! Riveting!
Al Santoli's book, To Bear Any Burden, is a narrative of stories told by 47 Americans, Vietnamese (both North and South), and Cambodians regarding their experiences before the US involvement, during the US war, and the war's aftermath (after the departure of US troops). Each tale (from two to 10 pages in length) is riveting in itself. The book moves in relative chronilogical order beginning in 1954 and concludes with the present (circa 1985). Each tale is successfully interwoven with the next story such that there is a cohesiveness and a logical flow to the story telling timeline.

Some of the stories are quite stunning:from the description of US soldiers being called baby-killers and spat on after they returned to the US [difficult to comprehend in this patriotic post 9/11 world] to the horror stories of the Communist regimes in Cambodia and in North/South Vietnam after the fall of Saigon [after reading theses stories, one should question why the US would want to establish ties to Vietnam].

This "straight from the hip" narrative is recommended to anyone wishing to learn more about the scenes from a participant's point of view.

A "must-read" classic of America's involvement in SE Asia
I first read To Bear Any Burden when it was originally released in 1985. This has been a 'must-read' classic of American involvement in Southeast Asia since it was published. For it, Santoli interviewed, in depth, 47individuals representative of that involvement from 1945 into the1980s--Americans, Viet-Namese (communists and anti-communists), Cambodiansand Laotians. The book is so artfully compiled as to flow like a singlenarration; yet the 'cast of characters' are separate in time, space,culture and social rank--an entire spectrum from ambassadors to villagers,soldiers to politicians, in one volume. No ones education about theViet-Nam War is complete unless they've read this book. ... Read more

Isbn: 0253213045
Sales Rank: 113039
Subjects:  1. Asia - Southeast Asia    2. History    3. History - Military / War    4. History: American    5. Military - Vietnam War    6. Personal narratives    7. United States - General    8. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975    9. United States    10. Military history   

Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965
by Harvey C. Neese, John O'Donnell, Harvey Neese
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Hardcover (01 November, 2000)
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Reviews (6)

Interesting.
These are the views of seven people, Americans and Vietnamese, who in the early sixties contended that the US should pursue a counterinsurgency approach instead of a full conventional war against the Viet Cong, only to be brushed aside by the Johnson/McNamara group. They suggested that once the "war for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people" was won, the communist threat should disappear.

Although I do not believe counterinsurgency war alone is the only valid approach because of 1) the presence of 200,000 Viet Cong left behind in South Vietnam by Hanoi in 1954, 2) the determination of Hanoi to conquer Saigon, 3) the opening of the Ho Chi Minh trail , this unconvential approach should have been tried first. Had it been combined with a complete interdiction of the trail, victory would have been more likely with less deployment of US troops.

What we have to remember is that the unique, and only goal of Hanoi was to conquer Saigon, no matter the cost in human lives and the time needed to achieve this goal.

The Unknow War to Save South Vietnam
To most Americans, the war in Vietnam began in March 1965 with the arrival of the U.S. Marines across the beach at Danang...But a handful of young American civilians had entered the war five years' earlier...Thousands more followed as the entire American Governent was mobilized to "win in Vietnam"..until it became obvious only the South Vietnamese themselves could obtain a victory.. This book offers an insight into the efforts, the successes andthe failures of these first Americans; and how we often were our own worst enemy...I had the privilege of serving as one of these men.PRELUDE TO TRAGEDY provides a unique insider look at how dedicated --and desperate--young Americans tried to head off the final outcome...Not a book for casual readers looking for combat stories, but a "must read" for any serious student of the Vietnam conflict.

The Greater Tragedy
'Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam'looks beyond the curtain of lies concocted by Johnson & McNamara in 1964.A simple truth remains too devastating for mainstream publication.Johnson pulled the trigger on the American War in Vietnam by ordering retaliatory strikes three months prior to the election of 1964.No mere coincidence. Johnson did so to win the election.No other factor accounts for Johnson's arrogant insistance on immediate retaliation to an event which never occurred. A 24 hour delay would have revealed there was no Tonkin Gulf attack as claimed. Johnson adamantly demanded an immediate attack for he feared any delay would deny him the use of his trump card as CinC. Air strikes were used to defeat Goldwater. Johnson won the election then defeated himself by his arrogant miss use of military power.Johnson's effort to intimidate Ho Chi Minh failed miserably. Ho recognized retaliatory strikes as the superficial show of force it was. Without a commitment to win Johnson's efforts were doomed to failure from the start. Certain defeat was recognized, long before Johnson stepped aside in '68.'Prelude'provides evidence of the impending tragedy as it unfolded.However the most damming evidence was left out. The purpose of the air strike was to win the election. Johnson's fear, greed & grasp for power must be recognized if we are to avoid future acts of arrogance leading to war by a renegade president. Our constitution did not grant dictatorial power to a ruthless tyrant. How then, did Johnson acquire sufficient power to over ride congressional restraint & military dissent?He did so by lies, deceit & intimidation for all who stood in his way including his Vice President.Humphrey was denied access to LBJ's inner circle of advisors on Vietnam. JCS members were blocked from attending crucial strategy sessions.Johnson reduced JCS members to pawns, merely carrying out miss guided 'strategies' concocted by McNamara & his 'War Room' of civilian 'experts'. Military officers were intimidated, insulted, humiliated & ignored by Johnson. Military strategies were dictated by Johnson's political agenda.Without a compelling national security threat, military logic or justification for acts of war in Vietnam, Johnson created the ruse of a Tonkin Gulf attack to over ride congressional & military reluctance to war. He then launched unprovoked acts of war to enhance his political image. Johnson's arrogance in resorting to war to win the '64 election is supported by evidence presented in 'Prelude to Tragedy'. The authors failure to state this self evident fact is understandable. Doing so would have invited disbelief, criticism and ostracism. Lies perpetrated by Johnson & McNamara have been assimilated into the very fiber of American perceptions of defeat in Vietnam. The dregs remain today. American foreign policy remains a threat to many, including our allies.Claims of justification for American efforts in Vietnam no longer hold water. 'Prelude to Tragedy' puts an end to McNamara's claim of a well intentioned humanitarian effort. It reveals false claims & deceit by LBJ then and McNamara now in their efforts to distort the reality & rewrite history.American aggression in Vietnam must be revealed & recognized if we are to restore a balance of power. Existing presidential powers enable incumbents to initiate acts of war without the advice or consent of congress.The War Powers Resolution has been ignored by presidents as unconstitutional. This breach of our constitution must first be recognized if it is to be corrected. Americans have yet to grasp this essential lesson from defeat in Vietnam. Failure to curb presidential war powers and restore the balance of power leaves the tragedy without redeeming value. The least we can do is make full use of lessons learned in Vietnam. This nation will not endure without an effective balance between congressional & presidential powers. Will Americans awaken in time to turn the ship of state around before running aground on another distant shore for the sake of political expediency? Or will McNamara & others succeed in efforts to rewrite that tragic chapter? This book contributes to an essential dialog. Recognition of "The Greater Tragedy" may follow. 'Dereliction of Duty' and 'The Wrong War' provide further insight into this American tragedy. ... Read more

Isbn: 1557504911
Sales Rank: 955761
Subjects:  1. 1945-1975    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. Foreign relations    4. History    5. History - Military / War    6. Military    7. Military - Vietnam War    8. Military History - Vietnam Conflict    9. Politics and government    10. United States    11. Vietnam    12. Vietnam (Republic)    13. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975   

The Myth of Inevitable Us Defeat in Vietnam (Strategy and History Series)
by W. W. Rostow, C. Dale Walton
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Paperback (January, 2002)
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Reviews (1)

Very Interesting, a Solid Read.
Many works on the American involvement in Vietnam focus on the innumerable mistakes we made over the course of nearly 15 years and conclude that the war was unwinnable from the start and America was doomed to failure.In this well-researched work, Dale Walton also examines numerous American mistakes, but draws the opposite and more logical conclusion: America was not doomed to fail in Vietnam and only did so as a result of numerous bad (and more importantly, avoidable) decisions on the part of policy-makers and military leaders.Had any number of these decisions been reversed at various points during the conflict, South Vietnam might still be a viable, democratic nation to this day.

Walton's book is extremely well organized and features 7 main chapters, each of which focuses on one aspect of the conflict and the associated problems.For example, Chapter 4 discusses US involvement and non-involvement in Laos and Cambodia.In July of 1962, President Kennedy signed the Laos Accords, a treaty which required that both the US and North Vietnam respect Laos' neutrality and prohibited any actions therein.Walton argues that it was bad enough to treat Indochina as a divided theater, but what was worse was that the US continued to honor the treaty long after it was clear to everyone that North Vietnam was violating the agreement and resupplying guerrillas in the South through the Ho Chi Minh trail.This was one of many instances in which the US government wished to have the best of both worlds: extremely limited involvement but also definite victory.It was not to be.Chapter 5 discusses how American policy was severely limited in its thinking because of an unnecessarily high fear of Chinese involvement.US fear of PRC involvement (as had occurred in Korea) stopped many potentially successful policies from being implemented.And yet intelligence showed that the PRC neither wanted to start a war with the US nor would it have been militarily ready (due to the disastrous reforms of Mao) for much of the period of America's involvement.

Ultimately, Walton's analysis is counterfactual and therefore open to debate.Perhaps success in Vietnam would've been more difficult than his book suggests, and maybe it could've been easier!But even if complete success in American terms would've been nearly impossible, the war could have been fought more efficiently and effectively.I found Walton's chapter on airpower to be the most interesting example of this inefficiency.Quite frequently you hear that the US dropped more tons of bombs in Vietnam than it did in all other wars combined.This is true, but as Walton notes, the tonnage is less important than the targets, and in Vietnam the US dropped 70% of its high-explosives in the South!Moreover, he states, the idea that the North was undeveloped and had nothing to bomb was a myth.The North wasn't as industrialized as many countries, but there were still industrial targets in Hanoi and Haiphong which weren't attacked by Johnson.Also, the low level of industrialization simply meant that the NVA had to import their military technology from the PRC and USSR.Thus the railroads and highway networks were an extremely important target for a strategic bombing campaign and yet the US stayed its hand.Johnson believed that a system of graduated pressure, bombing some targets but holding back from others as a gesture of peace, would bring the North to the bargaining table.He also implemented 16 bombing halts which he hoped would accomplish the same objective.But rather than tempting the North into accepting a settlement, these actions only proved that the US was not fully committed to Vietnam and wished to get out.Walton examines this topic and many others in great detail, providing a plethora of citations and commentary in the excellent footnotes.

I give the book four stars instead of five simply because it is written in a somewhat dry, scholarly tone.The book feels like a collection of academic essays, which is not a bad thing, but the prose isn't thrilling and a reader unfamiliar with Vietnam may not be drawn in.But to anyone with a good background in the history will certainly find this an informative and intriguing read. ... Read more

Isbn: 0714681911
Sales Rank: 854895
Subjects:  1. 1945-1989    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. History    4. History - General History    5. History: American    6. Military - Strategy    7. Politics and government    8. United States    9. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975    10. American history: Vietnam War    11. Asian history: Vietnam War    12. The Americas    13. Vietnam   

A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam
by Lewis Sorley
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (01 September, 2000)
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Editorial Review

There was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Lewis Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals,Creighton Abrams andHarold Johnson). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages.

A Better War is unique among histories of the Vietnam War in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow'sVietnam and Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and William Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to winning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy.--John J. Miller ... Read more

Reviews (47)

Best Look Yet at Abrams' War
Any student or scholar of the war must read this book to comprehend the Vietnam War from 1968 to 1975.While there are plenty of books whose authors assume that Vietnamization was ineffective or it was a return to counterinsurgency, Dr. Sorley provides the best scholarly account of the effectiveness of the situation in South Vietnam.The shift from Westmoreland's Search and Destroy strategy to Abrams' rebuilding of South Vietnam and strengthening of ARVN is an accomplishment that has long needed to be acknowledged.

Unfortunately, After McNamara's and Westmoreland's war sqaundered and divided U.S. support and demoralized the South Vietnamize, the American people did not have the national will or patience to support a the conflict any longer.Even if future scholars do not agree with the author's conclusions, they well atleast have to acknowledge "A Better War."

Wish it were true
Sorley doesn't have to convince me to like Abrams, or that his efforts at recovery in the wake of Westmoreland were remarkable. I wish it were true that we could have won the war under Abrams' leadership, but even Sorley's dedicated and painstaking review of new evidence did not convince me. Too much of the evidence is taken out of historical context, and it does not sufficiently address an essential variable: South Vietnam's government and military. A review of other old soldiers has proved more convincing to me, particularly the career, writings, and findings of General Matthew Ridgway. As Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower, Ridgway found himself confronting Indochina early on. Then and throughout the Vietnam War, he was a spokesman for military opposition to military intervention. Had Ridgway himself been in command, it would not have been a viable, sustainable means of negotiating or winning the conflict. Sorley's book provides insights and information worth reading, but it did not convince me that Abrams, or anyone else, could have won that war.

Great information, could be better written
This is a very serious book. It's packed with detail and analysis from previously unrevealed sources and first-hand interviews. That's both a good and bad thing. Good because Sorley makes his case very well, bad because sometimes the detail gets a bit monotonous and tedious. But, overall, this is a fine book that is sure to challenge some commonly held beliefs about the Vietnam War.

As the subtitle makes clear, Sorley deals exclusively with the latter half of the war, namely from General Creighton Abrams' promotion to commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1968 to the final U.S. pullout in 1975. Sorley concludes that this period of the war was vastly different from the first half - different tactics, different strategy, different and better results. It was, in essence, a better war.

Abrams' successor was General Westmoreland, and he preferred large divisions that searched for the enemy in the jungles. This caused high casualties, confusion among the ranks, logistical difficulties, and lowered morale, especially among the enlisted men.

Abrams arrived with a different strategy. Rather than search-and-destroy with large divisions, he preferred secure-and-hold with smaller units. He believed that the war would be won at the village level. The villages must remain safe from North Vietnam Army (NVA) attacks and Viet Cong infiltrations. Once that happened, the larger cities like Saigon could go on the offensive and secure themselves from enemy shelling. With the cities and villages secure, the South Vietnamese could organize their own forces, units that included village, city, and regional troops. Once that was done, the U.S. Army could slowly leave the ground fighting to the South Vietnamese while supplying air cover, supplies, and advice.

According to Sorley, by 1972 this strategy had succeeded, so well that the war could have been considered won. The villages were safe and secure, the VC was no longer a factor, and the NVA was nowhere in South Vietnam. Massive U.S. air strikes had slowed the flow of NVA troops and war equipment to the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

So if all this is true, then what happened? Why did the communists win the war? Several reasons, according to Sorley:

Lack of support from the politicians at home. Congress and the Nixon Administration were more concerned with pulling out and less concerned with victory. By 1972, Abrams had fewer than 50,000 troops at his disposal, which makes his achievements even more impressive.
Unflagging support for the North from China and the Soviet Union. When the Paris agreement was ratified, and the North immediately violated it by flooding the South with troops and tanks, the U.S. failed in its promise to punish the North with air support. The Communists proved better allies than the U.S., because they kept the North well-stocked, while the South steadily ran out of supplies.
North Vietnamese officials kept in constant contact with the anti-war movement in America, using it to spread communist propaganda and lies. This undermined public support for the war, which at one time was high.
This is the essence of Sorley's book. It's a powerful case. What I found sad was America's total abandonment of South Vietnam. We had fought for years to keep the country from communist domination and then threw it all away when victory was so close.

It was not our finest hour. ... Read more

Isbn: 0156013096
Subjects:  1. Asia - Southeast Asia    2. History    3. History - Military / War    4. Military    5. Military - General    6. Military - United States    7. Military - Vietnam War   

Stolen Valor : How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and Its History
by B. G. Burkett, Glenna Whitley
Average Customer Review:
Hardcover (01 September, 1998)
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Reviews (220)

There's a reason this guy is self-published

Surprised at the poor quality of writing and research in a book so widely quoted in Internet chat rooms as the last word on VN vets. The mistakes he made re Kerry's medals and the membership of VVAW are probably the most recently exposed problems with the book, but there are plenty more just in terms of historical context.

Recommendation: don't bother. You can get more recent and accurate information just by performing your own Google search.

Republican Chickenhawks
Bottom Line, If the swift Vet Liars for Bush had any honor(which they don't)it wouldn't be worth stealin anyway. Bush hates Veterans. He has fought us tooth and nail and has been forced to part with every crumb that he has throw as us Vets. If you voted for Bush...you screwed your fellow Veterans.

Bukett get's it
I lobby on Capitol Hill for Veteran's benefits and have witnessed the collusion between the Veteran's affairs committees and the big VSO's like the DAV, who's preservation is tied to perpetuationg the myth that US Veteran's benefits are underfunded.

Splinter groups like the Veteran's Benefit Network, run by faceless and nameless people witout real names and questionable work ethic pervade this landscape.

The fact remains that no other Nation has treated Veteran's this well, and now the Bush administration has focused rightfully on those who fought. ... Read more

Isbn: 096670360X
Sales Rank: 109092
Subjects:  1. 1961-1969    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. History    4. History - Military / War    5. Influence    6. Military    7. Military - General    8. Military - Vietnam War    9. Sociology - General    10. United States    11. Vietnam War, 1961-1975    12. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975    13. Military history   

Aid and Comfort: Jane Fonda in North Vietnam
by Henry Mark Holzer, Erika Holzer
Average Customer Review:
Hardcover (04 March, 2002)
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Reviews (14)

For Those Who Either Have Forgotten What Janey Did
or are also willing to forgive John Wilkes Booth for murdering Abraham Lincoln, or wish to bestow honors on Benedict Arnold.

This review is being written on the 160th anniversary of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, but some of the other reviewers who are willing to forgive Janey Fonda for sitting and grinning in a North Vietnamese Anti-Aircraft pit, or making her "Axis Sally" style broadcasts on Radio Hanoi would probably give ol' John Wilkes a pass too.

Oh yeah, we committed atrocities in 'Nam. Oh yeah, President Nixon lied to us. Oh yeah, we'd love to bed down ol' Jane.

In the Holzers' insightful book herein lies the problem. SHE COMMITTED TREASON, FOLKS. TREASON - and while we might not have been at war with North Vietnam - a mistake that the JFK-LBJ Democrats gave us - she took her celebrity and her fame and money and spit on America and on better men and women than she'll ever be.

Jane Fonda was and is a traitor. Sorry, but if you can't accept that, then go and place flowers on that empty boot at West Point.

And speaking of atrocities. What about the atrocities those whom she supported - and still supports - committed in Cambodia and in Vietnam. Oh yeah, Janey cries that the "hard liners" took over. Either she is really stupid - or really crass or both. It would have made NO difference in that kind of totalitarian society who took over...they still would have murdered or shoved opponents into concentration camps.

And this is the accomplishment of the Holzers. Not only do they point out the reasons why Janey - pretty as she is - is as bad as Benedict or John Wilkes, and document it thoroughly - but why she should have spent hard time in prison rather than making movies in Hollyweird.

A better buy than her tales of threesomes with perverts like Vadim, or subsequent hangouts with the fellow traitor Hayden and whooping it up (and insulting Native Americans) with Teddy the Yacht Boy.

To forgive is divine.
Jane Fonda has apologized for her ignorance.She has asked for forgiveness.She has acknowledged being young and stupid and guilty of horrible judgment for her Viet Nam antics.She has made a mistake and is sorry for it.If we are all going to be held accountable for stupid things we've done when we were younger, none of us will hit the mark as respectable adults. This book is stuck in a time warp. The vets who continue to "blame" Jane Fonda for what happened to them in Viet Nam need to figure out who they're really angry at and come to terms with their anger and find a way to move on.Jane Fonda didn't start the war, she didn't cause it and she didn't end it.She was simply caught up in the Hollywood machine that perpetuated all sorts of opinions about the war at the time and her celebrity at the time had a lot to do with it.
I admire Ms. Fonda for the woman she is today, not for the mistakes she made nearly 30 some odd years ago.She is sorry.Let's move on and quit calling for her head on a platter.In 2005, we have bigger fish to fry, and our county's current problems are no fault of Jane Fondas.Let it go.

Jane Fonda: A Scapegoat for our Consciousness?
This book does an impressive job of compiling exhaustive data, facts and details regarding Jane Fonda's life and in particular her antiwar activities, yet the reader is left with the impression that the authors spent the Vietnam War years residing in Romania.

For those of us who lived through this turbulent and confusing time (first reaching America's consciousness mid-1965 or so) wewere given little information as to what led to our rapid and escalating involvement in the Southeast Asian hostilities. Instead of definitive answers we were continually spoon-fed reports guaranteed to magnify our spiraling fears of Communism and threats to the Free World.

In the years since the cessation of hostilities it has come to light that our involvement in Vietnam was the result of political blundering on the part of President John Kennedy
and by extension, his successors Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. With Vietnam Kennedy illustrated once again hisinexperience in handling world affairs (U-2 Spy Plane Incident, Bay of Pigs Invasion, etc.)and after our committment, he proved reluctant to withdraw American forces for fear of political disaster. Johnson and Nixon, both inheriting this political quagmire, continued to send us deeper into the conflict for similar reasons.

What the author's fail to take into account is that most everything Jane Fonda told us in her shrill crusade has proven to be true. For example, Richard Nixon DID secretly escalate the bombing of Cambodia, then lied to the U.S. people about it; U.S. troops continued to be sent to Vietnam in growing numbers while we were officially told withdrawals were occurring; and Jane Fonda's claims of political harassment were also proven to be true-she was placed on secret FBI and Justice Department harassment lists and targeted by authorities for her activities, at Nixon's request.

As the war dragged on other high profile celebrities began to openly and vocally oppose the war-among them Candice Bergen, Judy Collins, Jack Nicholson, Dennis Hopper, Donald Sutherland, even America's TV homemaker, Donna Reed-yet Jane was the first to place her career and her life in possible jeopardy for her beliefs. Cassius Clay made a public refusal to serve in Vietnam when called to duty, yet he is still revered by many of the same Americans quick to condemn Jane Fonda.

The fact that our government repeatedly refused to classify the Vietnam conflict as a war-though we were involved over a 10 year period-reduces the author's charges of treason to dust and clearly illustrates what a bungled attempt this government made to win a conflict that from the outset was impossible.

Jane Fonda in many ways used the wrong approach to educate us on the truths about Vietnam-her methods were extreme and often objectionable, yet it was ultimately shown that her instincts and quest for the truth were well-founded and accurate. ... Read more

Isbn: 078641247X
Sales Rank: 277205
Subjects:  1. Anthropology - General    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. Collaborationists    4. Fonda, Jane,    5. History    6. History - General History    7. History: World    8. Propaganda    9. Treason    10. United States    11. United States - General    12. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975   

A Vietcong Memoir : An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath
by TROUNG NHU TANG
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (12 March, 1986)
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Reviews (14)

HEAVY ON POLITICS, NOT ON GUERILLA WARFARE
I gladly award this book a 4-star rating. The author expresses himself well, and certainly has a lot to say about Vietnam's military struggle. He details Vietnam's fight against (1) the French; (2) the U.S.; and (3) North Vietnam and their Soviet supporters.

What's missing is a more gritty description of guerilla warfare. As I was reading this I wrote in the column "So who invented the perkinje pit?", and"How effective were the coca-cola cans you guys turned into bombs?" and"How did you convince housewives to become snipers and kill people?" There is nothing like that here. According to the author the Viet Cong were one big, happy family that had fun together when they weren't being tragically bombed by American B-52s.

Tang's description of Vietnamese politics is even a bit sketchy. He talks quite a bit about Ho Chi Minh's beliefs in "independence," and what a humble, sweet guy "Uncle Ho" was. He never says what Ho's beliefs about guerilla warfare were. Really, how did this "Sweet guy" resolve to have his people put on black pajamas and become killers?

With his high and mighty position in the Viet Cong administration, Tang would have known where the V.C.'s supplies were coming from. He mentions the Ho Chi Minh trail, but nothing about who gave all those poor vietnamese the gear they used. He says that in 1975 the South Vietnamese army (enemies of the Viet Cong) were going to be "outgunned." I remember writing in the column "WHERE'D YOU GET THE GUNS, TANG?"

Basically, this is a very good book. It is NOT a definitive account of guerilla warfare, however.

A Biography, with little analysis/explanation of the NLF
I chose to read this book because of my interest in the Vietnam War.I like a balanced approach, and wanted to see what the opposition had to say, other than the official Communist party line.

While the author is impressive, and lead an interesting life, I ws dissapointed by the book.Its mostly his biography, with little analysis.

What I was looking for was a book by someone from the COmmunist side on the forming, organisation, and running of the NLF.What were their concerns, difficulties etc.A few pages address this, but the vast majority are about the author and some of his friends.

As a biography its fine, but as a book on the NLF theer isnt enough there.It could have been cut by 2/3.
I can't recommend it for students of the Vietnam War.

An insightful look
Truong Nhu Tang does an excellent job of taking us through the seamy underside of the National Liberation Front.His lessons in dealing with the Party are extremely revealing and leave the reader both admiriing and feeling sorry for him, though he was considered the enenmy in the horrific conflict.

He provides an excellent look at the political aspects of the NFL, PRG, Vietcong, et al. and the way they viewed the dizzying conflict.Truong's only failing, ironically, is not seeing the motivations of the American political powers.While expousing the virtuotous goals of his organizations, he fails to see that ultimately, his people were failed by their revolution and that the American agenda (though bloody and lasting too long) succeeded in demonstrating the Western will to stop what could have truly become "the Domino Effect".The dominoes stopped in Southeast Asia.

Though the revolution was more than a Communist vs. Democracy battle, it does show us that, at least in this case, the best intentions of the Southerners was swept aside by their Northern "allies", who apparantly used the NLF, PRG, Vietcong, etc. as a mere puppet in their conquest. ... Read more

Isbn: 0394743091
Sales Rank: 24949
Subjects:  1. 1945-1975    2. 1975-    3. Biography    4. History - General History    5. History: American    6. Military - Vietnam War    7. Personal narratives    8. Personal narratives, Viet Cong    9. Politics and government    10. Revolutionaries    11. Trng, Nh Tang    12. Vietnam    13. Vietnam War, 1961-1975    14. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975    15. History / Military / Vietnam War    16. Tr½¼ng, Nh½ Tang   

A Gift of Barbed Wire: America's Allies Abandoned in South Vietnam
by Robert S. McKelvey
Average Customer Review:
Hardcover (01 August, 2002)
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Reviews (3)

Ultimate betrayal
I have returned to Vietnam many times...I speak the language and have known about the atrocities that occured after April 30, 1975.I have read and re-read this work and I compare it to another great book...Decent Interval by Frank Snepp.The stories are unique yet the same, reeking of betrayal and abandonment by a "friend".
The author reveals arduous research and the ability to place these anecdotes onto paper without losing emotion and perhaps color.As a previous reviewer has stated...better late than never.My congradulations and thanks to the author.
I would give this book more stars if possible.
I am the author of ...Eye of the Tiger and Thoughts Etched in Jade.

Enlightening.
In this book, Dr. McKelvey wrote a detailed and intimate account of the South Vietnamese military officers' fates after the end of the Vietnam War.

The message is troublesome but not surprising: the military personnel were rounded into re-education camps and suffered untold tragedies from humiliation, torture, mental degradation to physical impoverishment within a communist prison system. The majority of the officers were jailed from ten to fifteen years; one officer was detained for a total of 22 years.

While 70,000 former political inmates and their families were allowed to immigrate to the U.S. through the ODP (Orderly Departure Program), many more are still living on the fringes of the Vietnamese communist society. A former major drives a pedicab for a living. In this McKelvey's book, we heard the voices of a doctor, a tailor, a politician, an engineer, a spy, a pilot, and a teacher. They all endured "grueling and unforgiving ordeals that only the strongest would have survived." Family members were ostracized for being related to the political prisoners; their wives suffered uncounted financial, emotional, physical hardships, their children barred from a decent education.

The book is one of the few that deal with the long-term psychological effects of the incarceration on the inmates and the sufferings of their relatives.

The author concludes that: 1) War does not end when peace treaties are signed because the negative rippling effects of war and destruction affect many generations to come. 2) The U.S. should be very careful about intervening militarily in any part of the World. 3) The U.S., if it does go to war, cannot simply abandon friends and allies to the mercies of common enemies.

Rather late than never
I am a student from Vietnam and now studying in the U.S. I chanced to read this book in our university library. Thanks the AUTHOR for an insightful book.

In fact, my family background was 'clean' in the eyes of our government because my parents were not involved in any military service for the former government. But I have friends whose family situations were exactly the same as those portrayed in the book. I must say those are incredible human sufferings, and not only for one generation. I am glad some of those stories are now heard, perhaps a bit late but still, better than never.

Here's a life-time lesson for me (and perhaps some others): no matter how and what communists tell you, don't hastily believe them. Just look at what and how they do, and you'll see it for yourself. For many of them, human dignity and lives are trivial and cheap. ... Read more

Isbn: 0295982241
Sales Rank: 690402
Subjects:  1. 1975-    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. History    4. History - General History    5. History: American    6. Military - Vietnam War    7. Political prisoners    8. Politics and government    9. Vietnam   

Prisoner of the Word: A Memoir of the Vietnamese Reeducation Camps
by Le Huu Tri
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Hardcover (01 March, 2001)
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Reviews (3)

A sad and humbling experience.
This book details the five-year ordeal of a former South Vietnamese officer through many reeducation camps in South Vietnam after the fall of Saigon.

It includes mind numbing details of beatings, starvation, hard work in the fields and pure harassment by the guards. The most interesting part is the description of how expertly the communists manipulated the prisoners' minds. The latter were tricked into believing they would be released earlier if they worked harder. And the "two week-reeducation" became a five year ordeal.

Those who would like to understand how the communist system works should read this book. The author is to be congratulated for bringing to us a detailed description of the communists' reeducation camps.

A sad and humbling experience.
This book details the five-year ordeal of a former South Vietnamese officer through many reeducation camps in South Vietnam after the fall of Saigon.

It includes mind numbing details of beatings, starvation, hard work in the fields and pure harassment by the guards. The most interesting part is the description of how expertly the communists manipulated the prisoners' minds. The latter were tricked into believing they would be released earlier if they worked harder. And the "two week-reeducation" became a five year ordeal.

Those who would like to understand how the communist system works should read this book. The author is to be congratulated for bringing to us a detailed description of the communists' reeducation camps.

A cautionary tale of the dangers of "spin control"
Prisoner Of The Word: A Memoir Of The Vietnamese Reeducation Camps is the chilling but accurate memoir of author Le Huu Tri's years as a prisoner of Vietnamese so-called "reeducation" camps, which were actually forced labor camps in which starvation, nonexistent medical care, and execution were all too common. Yet perhaps the most insidious facet of these camps was the authorities' ruthless control of information, rumors, and lies, which were manipulated to control not only the prisoners, but the general populace. Prisoner Of The Word not only describes a part of Vietnam's modern history; it is a cautionary tale of the dangers of "spin control" in any and every government of the world. Highly recommended reading. ... Read more

Isbn: 0930773608
Sales Rank: 613446
Subjects:  1. Biography / Autobiography    2. History    3. History: World    4. Military    5. Military - Vietnam War   

Voices of Vietnamese Boat People: Nineteen Narratives of Escape and Survival
by Mary Terrell Cargill, Jade Quang Huynh, Jade Ngoc Quang Huynh
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (October, 2001)
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Reviews (2)

A wonderful book about real and courageous people
This book is the most moving book I have ever read.

It presents the life a Vietnamese people after 1975 through the stories of 19 vietnamese boat people who immigrated to the US after sometimes several attempts. The stories are told in simple and humble terms. They describe the life under communist ruling and the fear and courage to escape it. The book shows the life in the refugee camps around South East Asia. It is also a book about hope of a better life and about the adjustement to the American language and the American way of life. It also shows how these admirable people integrated in the US society.

The author should be congratulated for telling this untold stories that everybody who heard of Vietnam should know. All my respect and admiration to the Vietnamese people who suffered so much for so long.

An aftermath of the war.
From 1975 to 1996, more than one million people have made the trip from Vietnamese shores to other Southeastern Asian countries braving weather, hunger, dehydration, storms, and pirates. About 500,000 others have drown or died at seas. In spite of these ordeals, these people keep rushing to the seas to flee communism. Had they had the means, the majority would have left their country.

These are the stories of 19 people who left their homeland on rickety boats, their ordeals at seas, their lives in refugee camps, and their relocation in western countries. They risked their lives to look somewhere else for FREEDOM they could not find in their country.

There are many waves of refugees throughout the years. People from the first wave were mostly professionals and went almost immediately to the U.S. or other western countries. Refugees from subsequent waves traveled in rickety boats, were less well schooled and spent a longer time in the Asian refugee camps.

The authors are to be congratulated for bringing this topic to the forefront. ... Read more

Isbn: 0786407859
Sales Rank: 416671
Subjects:  1. Biography    2. Biography / Autobiography    3. General    4. History    5. History: World    6. Military - Vietnam War    7. Refugees    8. United States    9. Vietnam    10. Vietnamese Americans   

Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992
by Jane Hamilton-Merritt
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Paperback (01 December, 1999)
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Reviews (15)

UNTOLD HISTORY
THE BOOK "TRAGIC MOUNTAINS" GIVES ME AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE HISTORY IN THE PAST.ALSO, A REASON WHY HMONG WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL PEOPLE WHO LIVED IN THE SHADOWS BECAUSE THEY HAD MADE LOAS A HISTORY BY JOINED WITH THE AMERICANS TO FOUGHT AGANIST COMMUNIST.IT INSPIRED ME IN MANY WAYS WHICH I CAN NOT EXPLAIN BUT WITH TEARS AND FEARS.NOW THAT THE HISTORY IS TOLD IN THE BOOK "TRAGIC MOUNTAINS,"I FELT THAT IT IS MY DESTINATION TO MAKE A DIFFERANCE IN AMERICA."BY MAKING A DIFFERANCE IN AMERICA, IT WILL BECAME PART OF OUR HISTORY," SAID NELSON NAGAI.

Candlestick Fac analysis
Jane Hamilton-Merritt's research and reporting is outstanding.After serving as a Candlestick fac (NKP 1969-1970),I have spent the last three years reading about these poor people who gave so much for the American aircrews.. I spent a two week'Sabbatical" at 20 alternateand was shocked by the yound age of V.P.s troops.Ms. jane has portrayed it brilliantly....Her work is phenomenal and should be required reading for the war colleges She correctly questions why any country would sign a treaty with the United States.. The genocide which we have supported by "sticking our heads in the sand" is grievous.I retired early from the USAF since I lost confidence in our government.Indeed even the services spent a great deal of their time trying to absorb each other's missions,rather than dealing with the losing battle in SEA in the 1970s.. The administrationnever told the American people that we were actually fighting against Russian and Chinese advisors leave alone that we were in Laos for almost ten years. .Every congressman should also read about this stain on our moral fiber .Somehow,there are more important things in this lifethan being reelected .Thank you and Bless Ms. Hamilton-Merritt for trying to wake up Washington. The best treatise ever on our Laotian allies !

Uncritical
This book is a fine example of utterly uncritical journalism.She starts out from accepting that the Hmong are victims of yellow rain and from this proceeds to "prove" it without first questionning whether the underlying assumption is valid.While one cannot but have sympathy for the Hmong (as for any people caught up in violent events largely of their own making) this should not mean that one ceases to have a brain. A useful balance to this right wing book is Grant Evans' book called, if I recollect correctly, "Yellow Rain".Also, Vang Pao was a heroin dealer and a CIA tool. Merritt conveniently overlooks this and places no responsibility at the door of this self-seeking greedy warlord. ... Read more

Isbn: 0253207568
Sales Rank: 146319
Subjects:  1. 20th century    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. Government policy    4. History    5. History - General History    6. History: World    7. Hmong (Asian people)    8. Laos    9. Military - Vietnam War    10. Wars   

Sideshow, Revised Edition : Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia
by William Shawcross
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (25 October, 2002)
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Reviews (10)

History to be reviewed over and over again
Shawcross gets into the minds of Kissinger and Nixon so well. His is a book to be read over and over again to see the working of the U.S. Government and how it can destroy a country. He talks about the 25 pound shark at the bottom of a swimming pool full of children-- and we understand how the USA's leaders destroyed a country. It is a lesson to be learned over and over again as we go about destroying other countries. This is one great read - worthy of the time it takes to understand it. A victory for the author over Mr. Kissinger.

The Madman Theory of War
Really bad decisions made by the Nixon administration toward Indochina and the Vietnam War are now fairly obvious. However, we must remember how difficult this type of investigation would have been back when Shawcross did his intensive research back in the late 70s. Here Shawcross builds a very hard-to-dismiss case against Nixon and Henry Kissinger, in terms of how their problematic military and diplomatic strategies at least indirectly led to the hideous destruction of Cambodia (in fact, one of Nixon's documented strategies was to make the Communists think he was a madman, assuming they'd get scared and give up).

During the earlier years of the war, Cambodia was a relatively tranquil nation that was trying to remain neutral. But the country was being used as a hideout by North Vietnamese soldiers, leading to bombing by the Americans. Here Shawcross shows how Nixon and Kissinger made use of political trickery and overhyped threats to keep the bombing going to an extent that was far more destructive than necessary. As a bonus, this book also documents the wire-tapping paranoia and unconstitutional shenanigans in the Nixon White House. Shawcross is especially tough on Kissinger, finding that he disregarded the integrity and safety of Cambodia (which he had only ever visited for four hours), in favor of short-term political advantages and unyielding ideology. The relentless bombing destabilized Cambodian society, leading indirectly to the hideous genocide and societal destruction enacted by the Khmer Rouge a few years later. It is difficult to argue with Shawcross' heavily researched conclusions, and the hellish wholesale collapse of Cambodia (of a type never before seen in modern history) becomes all the more poignant as a result.

Be sure to get an edition of this book from 1986 or after, in which Shawcross adds materials from the political firefight that the book ignited. Kissinger was obviously upset and went to great lengths, through articles written by his lackey Peter Rodman, to try and disprove Shawcross' assertions. If your copy of this book contains these articles, you'll be quite bemused by Rodman's evasive, dissembling, and downright condescending rebuttal attempts, which are easily shot down by Shawcross. This war of words in itself proves that Kissinger had, and always will have, a lot to answer for. [~doomsdayer520~]

The Pernicious Mind of Dr. Kissinger
On March 18, 1969 the United States initiated a bombing offensive on a neutral South East Asian nation, Cambodia, without the consent or knowledge of the U.S. Congress.The campaign was constitutionaly illegal and serves as a glaring result of unchecked Executive power.

Shawcross discusses the B-52 raids over Cambodia in great detail. His use of countless government documents, gathered through the Freedom of Information Act, brush away much of the smoke that had, prior to publication, clouded the incident in secrecy.

Shawcross sites many reasons why the architect of the campaign, Dr. Henry Kissinger, viewed the bombing of Cambodia as a dire necessity to U.S. national security.Kissinger held that North Vietnamese supply lines and sanctuaries located along the Vietnam-Cambodian border were costing numerous American lives and were preventing the Vietnamization of the war, hence prolonging U.S. involvment. Until these sancutuaries were destroyed, Nixon would not be able to achieve, his"Peace with Honor." Further more, Kissinger understood that the Vietnamese were in a strong position in negotiating peace.It was hoped that the massive bombing campaign would force the Vietnamese to consent to a mutual cease-fire.Kissinger's rationle does make a great deal of sense when studying the situation from a realist perspective, as does Dr. K's "Madman Theory," of war and foreign policy.

Kissinger believed that essentially a nation's foreign policy would prove ineffective if not backed by a threat of irrational force.When it became time to negotiate peace with Hanoi, the Nixon administration's insanity, represented by the devestation of a neutral nation, was supposed to bring strength to the American position.

Ironically, the bombing of Cambodia was one of the main factors in the demise of the Nixon administration, lead to an notable increase in Communist support, and ultimately was the catalyst for the third Indochinese war.

Indeed, Shawcross provides an interesting study on the effects the American campaign had, not only on the destablization of Cambodia, but also on the rise of the genocidal Khmer Rouge. With U.S. urging, if not complicity, Lon Nol usurped acting head of state King Nordom Sihanouk, thus creating a strong bond with the United States.Being fueled with U.S. weapons, dollars and advisors, Lon Nol began to wage a war against communist insurgents as well as any party viewed as hostile to his regime.

As the conflicts raged in Lon Nol's Cambodia, evidence of the Nixon/Kissinger bombing campaign came to light.Congress was appalled and demanded the immediate halt to the air strikes. Kissinger was left without a valuable bargaining chip at the peace talks in Paris.The Vietnamese leadership knew that administration was on the political ropes, and that South Vietnam was on the verge of toppling completely.

As North Vietnamese forces closed on the southern capital Saigon, Khmer Rouge forces took Phnom Penh, signaling another communist victory in South East Asia.Now, instead of dousing the flames of communism in the region, the U.S. unintentionally created three communist states: Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

With the emergence of Watergate evidence, the Nixon administration was a sinking ship, and the rest, as they say, is history.

Aside from simply documenting the Cambodian bombings, Shawcross often attacks Kissinger the man.He often uses testimony, interviews and assorted documents in order to paint Dr. K as a demented war-monger, and liar; yet always staying between the lines of legality.

Kissinger was deeply resentful of the publication of such a scathing attack, going so far as to publish his own rebuttal, albeit written under the name of an underling.The banter between the Kissinger camp and Shawcross continued for a number of years, and I imagine Kissinger cringing everytime he sees a copy of Sideshow.

As scathing as Shawcross' attack on Kissinger may be, Dr. K was still a very adept diplomat, and during his time serving the Nixon administration did accomplish some stunning diplomatic coups, such as normalizing relations with China. In conclusion, like everything, there are two sides, and one seeking to truly understand history will analyze both sides with equal scrutiny. ... Read more

Isbn: 081541224X
Sales Rank: 390239
Subjects:  1. Government - U.S. Government    2. History    3. History & Theory - General    4. History - General History    5. History: World    6. Military - Vietnam War    7. North American    8. American history    9. Asian / Middle Eastern history: postwar, from c 1945 -    10. Cambodia    11. North America    12. Political science & theory    13. World history   

Cambodia, 1975-1978
by Karl D. Jackson
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (17 March, 1992)
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Reviews (3)

an excellent background book
This collection of essays about the Pol Pot Regime is an invaluable resource for a student of that period.It is not a very good historical overview (read Chandler's book for that), but it provides several excellentsources for analyses of specific sides of the DK regime.Particularlyinteresting (for me, anyway) were the chapters on the intellectual originsof the Khmer Rouge, a topic that is often mentioned but rarely exploredwith the depth found here.

Kenneth Quinn, one of the contributors,finished an appointment as US ambassador to Cambodia in July 1999.

A clear, concise history of the Khmer Rouge
The nine essays which comprise Jackson's book offer a chillingly descriptive account of the Khmer Rouge and the destruction they brought to Cambodian society.Even if you are a Cambodia "novice" (as I am)you will still find this book easy to understand and chock-full of valuableinformation.The 250 pages of actual text in this book were so wellwritten and "user-friendly" that I was able to read it all in onesitting.

For those who wish to go beyond Joffe's "The Killing Fields"
A balanced, objective account of the Cambodian revolution that provides a global picture of the extraordinary and horrifying events that took place in this small country between 1975 and 1978.Fascinating essays are included on topics as diverse as the Khmer Rouge economy, ideology, and power structure, as well as the social and psychological makeup of Cambodia, the intellectual origins of the Khmer Rouge, and the pattern and scope of the almost unbelievable violence perpetrated by the revolutionary army and government.This book is refreshingly thorough and unemotional.The authors allow the facts to speak for themselves.The only drawback is the often leaden writing of Timothy Carney, a contributor of two essays.A selection of photographs is also included. ... Read more

Isbn: 069102541X
Sales Rank: 544795
Subjects:  1. 1975-1979    2. Asia - Southeast Asia    3. Cambodia    4. Government - International    5. History    6. History - General History    7. History: World    8. Indo-China - History    9. Military - Vietnam War    10. Asian and Asian American Studies    11. History / Military / Vietnam War    12. Political Science and International Relations   

When the War Was over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution
by Elizabeth Becker
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (01 October, 1998)
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Editorial Review

Elizabeth Becker's When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution is a heart-rending history of modern Cambodia--a state whose people have, in the last 30 years, endured war, political upheaval, international betrayal, and genocide. Beginning with the Khmer Rouge overthrow of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime in 1975, Becker examines the historical patterns of violence and authority within Cambodian culture that made the Khmer Rouge's slaughter of close to 2 million people possible.

Becker integrates interviews with Cambodian leaders and ordinary citizens with a penetrating analysis of the politics of the cold war and humanitarianism. For example, she follows the story of Mey Komphot, a banker, who, like millions of others, was displaced from his life in Phnom Penh and marched to a labor camp. She also explores how the United States, as well as many states within the United Nations, refused to acknowledge the forced departures and the killing in order to appease China's hunger for punishing Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia. By contrasting the concerns of states with those of people, Becker shows how the international order has repeatedly betrayed the people of Cambodia. When the War Was Over is more than just an authoritative account of the Cambodian Revolution; Becker's trenchant portrait of the dynamics of power and human suffering serves as a warning about how diplomatic imperatives can blunt the United Nations' ability to preserve human rights and life. --James Highfill ... Read more

Reviews (13)

Phenomenal account of the Cambodia situation!!
I bought this book because i was going to visit Cambodia and like many people, i wanted to understand the whole political situation of that country.I only knew some information about the suffering of refugees and about Pol Pot.From the moment i started this book, i just couldnt put it down.Ms Becker gives youthe whole nine yards with this book in a very simple and interesting manner.With her crystal clear explanations, you can understand every political,geographical and socially term and situation.Her style of writing has you on the edge of your seat and you right in the middle of things.The chapters of the book that deal with all the major powers and their diplomatic "dances" toward Cambodia are very well presented and ,again, in terms that we all can understand.She also presents the Vietnam side of the story without dwelling too much on details but , at the same time, giving you all the necessary information needed to understand the vietnamese intervention in Cambodia....Excellent work!!

Excellent. A must read on Cambodian History
I really liked this book. The book covers a lot of ground. Apart from covering at Cambodian history, the book tells the tales of individual Cambodians who have lived or died through the Khmer Regime. The book also covers the world political influence as the tragedy unfolds in Cambodia and how each of these players plays an active or passive role in the tragedy. The reporting on the resolution of the conflict is also very interesting. It shows how geopolitics and individual personalities are so critical in resolution of these types of conflicts.

The book also covers US attitudes towards the IndoChina region in the aftermath of the Vietnam war and what the implications of the attitude were to the region.

The only drawback of the book I found is that sometimes the narrative gets a little tedious and repetitive.

Tedious and poorly written
I came here looking for a book that might explain the background to what happened in Cambodia. But i can only conclude Becker covered this turmoil from the her apartment's balcony. This has to be one of the most lifeless products of a typewriter keyboard that I have ever read. Maybe that's too harsh, but I know I didn't find the answer to anything I was looking for. Who did she write this for, herself? ... Read more

Isbn: 1891620002
Subjects:  1. 20th century    2. Asia - General    3. Asia - Southeast Asia    4. Cambodia    5. History    6. History - General History    7. History: World    8. Public Affairs & Administration   

Brother Number One: A Political Biography
by David P. Chandler
Average Customer Review:
Paperback (01 February, 1999)
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Reviews (6)

The way to make friends is not to kill people
Prof. Chandler discovered the real face behind Pol Pot (Saloth Sar), the initially enigmatic leader of the Red Khmer in Cambodia. He wrote a hallucinatory and tragic biography.

The background of Pol Pot is common for many Communist Party (CP) members. He was recruited by the local CP when he studied in a foreign country. For Pol Pot, it was in France where the CP was totally controlled by the USSR and her Stalinist doctrine. The USSR recruited foreign members everywhere in order to use them as antennas all over the world.

When Pol Pot took power in Cambodia, he applied the Stalinist doctrine ruthlessly.
The similarities with Stalin are eminently striking: power struggle at the top of the party and liquidation of the old fellows, savage party purges, murderous goulags, indiscriminate collectivization, ethnic cleansing, deportation, show trials, forced confessions under torture, affectionate with little daughter, considering as enemies of the State those Khmer who came from a foreign country, fear of assassination, suspicious, dictatorial (didn't accept the slightest form of criticism).
Under Pol Pot, it went even so far that people who 'knew' an enemy where executed. The result: a genocide. Even children and BABIES were put to death.

David Chandler shows us that Pol Pot was really a dedicated communist, a party man, an organization man, a utopian thinker who believed in his killer's utopia till the end: "I did everything for my country".
A blatant lie: he did it only for his Khmer country and only for those Khmer who (were forced to) agree(d) with him. In other words, his utopia was more than nationalism, it was racism. For Pol Pot knew that 'Class and hatred had produced the victory. So hatred had to be maintained'.

This book contains excellent explanations of the background of the Cambodian conflict with Vietnam, and how Cambodia became a chess piece in a world conflict between the US, China and the USSR. Pol Pot's regime was supported by the US, because Cambodia was an enemy of Vietnam, who was an ally of the USSR.
This book stresses also the disastrous role of the feudalist king Norodom Sihanouk and the decisive influence of the US bombings of Cambodia, which turned part of the Khmer peasantry in favour of the Red Khmer.

Pol Pot's regime is a shame for Western intelligentsia, because some of his cronies (Khieu Samphan) studied like Pol Pot at Western universities.

This terrible biography is a reminder of the deadly dangers of utopian doctrines, if they can be implemented by a totallyconvinced individual who possesses a dictatorial power in a single ountry. As David Chandler states: the genocide would have continued, if Pol Pot had stayed in power.

A must read.

Brother Number One
I thought that this book was extremely well written and intellectually stimulating.While providing as many details about Pol Pot's life as can be found, Chandler also integrates this information into the recent history of Cambodia.He seems to believe that Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge can only be understood in the context of the times, and this definitely rings true after reading the book.True, he does offer a lot of interpretation and conjecture on Pol Pot's life and motives, but this is the job of the historian.Rarely do historical documents, especially documents about the Khmer Rouge, provide such information.Those who intend to understand and write about these events, are therefore forced to do this kind of interpretive work.So do not listen the first review given on this page.This book is awesome.

Pol Pot - still hard to grasp
If you are looking for a history of the Khmer Rouge regime, I'd rather recommend one of Ben Kiernan's books. If you are looking for a well-documented biography of Pol Pot, you are not going to like this book.
True, the author has gathered as much information on Pol Pot as possible, but that amount of information could be summarised on just a few pages. To make it into a book, you get a history of Cambodia - and there are better ones around than this one -, and lots of speculation about Pol Pot's psychology, which I found annoying. ... Read more

Isbn: 0813335108
Sales Rank: 421935
Subjects:  1. Biography    2. Biography & Autobiography    3. Biography / Autobiography    4. Biography/Autobiography    5. Cambodia    6. Contemporary Politics - Asia    7. Historical - General    8. Indo-China - History    9. Pol Pot    10. Political    11. Politics and government    12. Prime ministers